GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of Genocide (1948) defines genocide as a crime under international law, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, in which any of the following acts are committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. The specified acts are: (1) killing members of the group; (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

In my own work with Kurt Jonassohn, we have modified the United Nations definition of genocide to assist us in classifying and comparing a wide array of cases from ancient times to the present. For the purpose of our research, genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator. The last part of our definition permits us to include the intended annihilation of social and political groups in our sample of cases.

Helen Fein has proposed elements of a paradigm to detect genocide. She offers five propositions as specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for a finding of genocide: (1) that there was a sustained attack or continuity of attacks by the perpetrator to physically destroy group members; (2) that the perpetrator was a collective or organized actor or commander of organized actors; (3) that the victims were selected because

they were members of a collectivity; (4) that the victims were defenseless or were killed regardless of whether they surrendered or resisted; and (5) that the destruction of group members was undertaken with intent to kill and murder was sanctioned by the perpetrator.

Genocides have occurred throughout history. Their perpetrators have generally acted on the basis of one or more of the following motives: (1) to eliminate a real or potential threat; (2) to spread terror among real or potential enemies; (3) to acquire economic wealth; and (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology. The first three motives for genocide are most frequently found among perpetrators engaged in building or defending an empire, while genocides to fulfil a belief, a theory, or an ideology have become much more common in the modern era and often make citizens of the perpetrating state their first victims.

The twentieth century has witnessed at least 12 cases of genocide, seven large cases, meaning that the perpetrators killed about one million or more persons, and five smaller ones, that is genocides with under a million victims. The victims of the large genocides were the Armenians (1915), the Ukrainians (early193os), the Jews (1941-1945), the Sudanese animists and Christians (since the 1950s), the Bengals (1971), the Khmer of Cambodia (1975-1978) and the Tutsi of Rwanda (1994). The victims of the small genocides were the Herero (early 1900s), the Tutsi of Rwanda (1959-1962), the Hutu of Burundi (1972), the Communists of Indonesia (1965), and the East Timorese (1975 to today). To put genocide in the twentieth century in focus, let us examine three major cases: the Tutsi of Rwanda in 1994, the Armenian case, and the Holocaust.

II. THE CASE OF RWANDA: AN INTRODUCTION

The terms of the definition of genocide contained in Article II of the United Nations' Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) are clearly fulfilled in the case of Rwanda. From April to July 1994, hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were killed "with intent to destroy, in whole . . .," an "ethnical . . . group, as such . . .," the Tutsi of Rwanda. A great deal is already known about this case. It was a small circle around the widow of President Habaryimana of Rwanda, popularly known as the *akazu,* or the Little House, which perceived the power

sharing provisions of the Arusha Accords of 1993 as fatal to its ambition to cling to power and resolved to annihilate Rwanda's entire Tutsi population. It also sought to kill all Rwandan Hutu who advocated human rights or displayed sympathy for the plight of the Tutsi. President Habaryimana's perceived weakness made him expendable in the eyes of his in-laws and their associates. He had encouraged the dissemination of hate propaganda against Hutu human rights advocates and the Tutsi population, but he had also signed the Arusha Accords, and this betrayed his lack of determination.

The Rwandan media, encouraged by the *akazu* , played a major role in convincing many Hutu that they themselves would soon become the victims of a genocide. The largely Tutsi-staffed Rwanda Patriotic Front's (RPF) invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990 triggered this campaign. While newspapers and magazines spread the message in urban areas among the small proportion of the population that was literate, the *akazu* skillfully employed radio broadcasting to sow hatred and distrust among the much larger rural population. Government-owned Radio Rwanda was barred from inciting hatred after the signing of the Arusha Accords, but hard-liners from Madame Habaryimana's circle created Radio RTLM, a private station of their own. RTLM whipped up fear and ethnic hatred more effectively than Radio Rwanda using dynamic, innovative programming which introduced to Rwanda's airwaves a unique blend of the most popular music, informal talk radio, and culturally-coded attacks on Tutsi and their allies. Enormously popular, Radio RTLM severely damaged the bonds of solidarity between Hutu and Tutsi, who had lived as neighbors on almost every hill of Rwanda. One proof of RTLM's success was that Hutu farmers abandoned their homes *en masse* wherever the RPF advanced.

The shooting down of President Habaryimana's airplane as it descended for a landing at Kigali airport on 6 April 1994 detonated Rwanda's genocide. By July, Hutu soldiers, police officers, and militia members, frequently aided by civilian men, women, and children, had killed approximately 800,000 of their Tutsi neighbors in several well managed and centrally coordinated waves of mass murder. The dead constituted about 85 percent of the Tutsi who lived in Rwanda on 6 April 1994 or roughly 11 percent of Rwanda's entire population.

The most important motive for the genocide in Rwanda was the *akazu* 's desire to implement its ideology of Hutu racial superiority, whose roots can be traced back to the so-called Democratic Revolution of 1959. 1959 was the year in which the Belgian colonial administration abandoned its Tutsi allies in favor of the far more numerous Hutu. 1959 was also the year which saw an inversion of the dominant racial myths promulgated in Rwanda during the colonial era. The Tutsi myth held that they were immigrant rulers, racially distinct from the Hutu, and naturally superior to them. In its inverted, post-colonial form, the Hutu myth argued that all Tutsi were their oppressors and that all Hutu were liberators. In this way, the Tutsi were demonized as a race, rather than a class, and the oppression of the Tutsi under the new Hutu regime was justified.

Despite talk of democracy, the new Hutu leaders ruled in the authoritarian and secretive manner established by the deposed Tutsi elite and the Belgian colonial government. Rwandans continued to carry identity papers which marked them as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, but now ethnic quotas for the civil service, the schools, and the universities discriminated strongly against the Tutsi. In the army, soldiers were even barred from marrying Tutsi women. The mass persecution of Tutsi from 1959 to 1963 produced an exodus of Tutsi refugees to surrounding countries. The Tutsi outflow resumed in 1972 when the massacre of educated Hutu organized by the extremist Tutsi rulers of Burundi led to intensified discrimination against the Tutsi of Rwanda. By 1973, the number of Tutsi who had fled Rwanda as refugees was probably in the neighborhood of 700,000. It was against this background that the perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda judged the RPF's armed penetration from Uganda in 1990 and the coup against Burundi's President Ndadaye in 1993 as threats to their grip on power.

Economic factors played an important, if less significant, motivating role within Rwanda's Hutu political elite. As Rwanda's coffee and tin industries declined, access to foreign aid through control of the government became the elite's major source of income. Among rural Rwandans, other economic factors entered into the equation. Rwanda has one of the highest population densities among all of the world's agricultural nations. Land holdings are tiny and barely able to support rapidly growing families. The order to kill was made at the highest political

reminded of the darker pages of our history. They aim their attacks against books, memorials, and media presentations that remind us of mankind's cruelty towards its own kind. What seems to be overlooked by these participants in collective denial is that they are doing far more than engaging in an intellectual debate. They do not realize that collective denial of the past itself plays a crucial role in the recurrence of genocide. In our age of voluminous and instant communication, something that is not being communicated is perceived as something that is not happening. As Hitler's famous remark--"Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians"--indicates, collective denial encourages potential perpetrators.[7] We might paraphrase Hitler and ask today "who remembers Bangladesh, Burundi or all the other cases of genocide since the Second World War." For those of us who are concerned with trying to prevent future genocides, collective denial is one of the conditions that encourages potential perpetrators and must therefore be one area of our active intervention.

II. SOME PATTERNS IN GENOCIDE SINCE WORLD WAR II

The motives of the perpetrators of genocide after the Second World War fall into five broad categories:

1. To crush a separatist movement, as in Bangladesh in 1971, and the Sudan in the years 1955 to 1971 and 1980 to the present;

2. To dominate a domestic ethnic group, as in Burundi in 1972 and in Equatorial Guinea from 1968 to 1979;

3. To consolidate control of another state's territory, as in East Timor from 1975 to today;

4. To fulfill an ideology, as in Indonesia in 1965; Cambodia from 1975 to 1978; and Rwanda from April to July 1994; and

5. To develop domestic natural resources, as in the Amazon region of Brazil from the 1930's to the present.[8]

Several of the cases included in this typology involve more than one motive.[9] I have classified the cases according to my present judgement of which motive predominates. In the time available for this presentation, I cannot hope to discuss all the modern cases. For the purpose of bringing forward some of my analytical conclusions, I have chosen to focus my discussion on three of the five motives for contemporary genocides: 1) genocide to crush separatist movements; 2) genocide to dominate a domestic ethnic group; and 3) genocide to fulfill an ideology.

A. GENOCIDE TO CRUSH A SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

Regional concentrations of ethnic groups in poor and very crowded countries sometimes explode into separatist violence, especially when an authoritarian central government attempts to impose its policies on an ethnic group that already perceives itself to be the victim of internal colonialism. For these peoples, armed rebellion is often the only means of escaping the consequences of oppression and second-class citizenship.

The level of terror in a typical anti-separatist civil war is very high. The soldiers of the government army treat civilians in the rebellious territory as traitors. They burn crops, destroy villages, and carry out massacres. The provision of military hardware by foreign powers to both sides, a characteristic of all the cases in this category, brings with it the introduction of enormous fire power and raises the casualty level. Internationalization of these domestic conflicts also prolongs them. While the central government usually manages to stay in power, it cannot smother the ethnic group's fight for autonomy.[10] The perpetrator who employs genocidal killing to crush a break-away movement has already concluded that the population of the dissident region is overwhelmingly hostile to the central government. In these cases, genocide is accomplished through annihilatory central government attacks on noncombatants who are defined by the perpetrators as members of selected social and political groups.

One of the two genocides intended to crush a separatist movement--that in the Sudan--has gone on for many years and is still underway despite recent efforts to end the fighting through negotiations. The civil war the Sudan has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians,

including many thousands who died as a result of genocide. The genocide in Bangladesh began with an armed attack by Pakistan in March 1971 and lasted for nine months. Pakistan's terror tactics cost the lives of 1.2 to 3 million persons and were accompanied by large-scale rape and pillage. During the genocide, Bangalees belonging to certain elite groups--businessmen, civil servants, professionals, and teachers--as well as Awami League militants and Hindus were singled out as victims. It was only halted when the Indian Army attacked and defeated the armed forces of Pakistan.

Most genocides produce large numbers of refugees, but none have produced as many as the cases in this group. The genocide in Bangladesh sparked the largest single mass exodus of its kind in modern history. Some ten million Bangalees, nearly one-seventh of the population, fled to India to escape it.[11] In Ethiopia and the Sudan, government resettlement schemes and the military's attacks on civilians have forced hundreds of thousands of people into "resettlement" villages and refugee camps in hostile regions of their own countries, while additional hundreds of thousands of their fellow citizens have fled to neighboring countries.[12] The fighting in the Sudan has displaced 3.5 million people, according to the latest estimates.[13]

In the Ethiopia/Sudan relationship of the 1980s, both governments were perpetrators of crimes against humanity and both countries served as sanctuaries for the other country's victims.[14] In the years from 1979 to 1984, in addition to the 50,000 Ethiopian Oromo Muslim refugees who trekked to Somalia in search of food and safety from attack, another 225,000 Ethiopian refugees crossed into the Sudan, and some 300,000 starving Sudanese refugees entered Ethiopia. Paralleling the symmetry of these refugee migrations, the government of the Sudan assisted the separatist forces in the Ethiopian provinces of Eritrea and Tigré, while the Ethiopian government sent supplies to the Sudan People's Liberation Army fighting for the independence of the southern Sudan.[15]

The enormous number of refugees produced by anti-separatist genocides sends a clear signal to foreign governments and the media that something extraordinary is underway, but the reaction to these warnings is often misdirected. The conflict in the Sudan has attracted much less

media interest than the famine of 1984-85 in Ethiopia. However, the news that is reported usually emphasizes famine in the Sudan, while neglecting its roots in the attempts of Arab Muslim northerners to crush the black Christian separatists of the southern Sudan.

Intervention by foreign governments to stop a genocide requires an unusual combination of factors. If ever there were grounds for such intervention after 1945 they existed during Pakistan's assault on East Pakistan. It was India that stopped the killing in East Pakistan, emboldened by the problems of caring for ten million Bengali refugees and the chance to weaken Pakistan by playing midwife at the birth of Bangladesh. Thus, when intervention came in December 1971, it was by a neighboring state with a strong strategic interest motivating its political leaders.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi calculated that the benefits of her intervention would outweigh the costs. The United States exacted those costs--censure by the United Nations and heavy cutbacks in U.S. aid. Nixon and Kissinger punished India by blocking the release of more refugee relief to New Delhi and ordering that no Agency for International Development funds should be provided for India in the next federal budget.[16] Kissinger explains in his memoirs that he interpreted the Indian intervention as evidence that Mrs. Gandhi, encouraged by the Soviet Union, intended to "settle accounts with Pakistan once and for all and assert India's preeminence on the subcontinent."[17] While conceding that Pakistan had acted "unwisely, brutally, and even immorally," he insisted on the primacy of his "geopolitical perspective" over the "regional perspective" of the State Department, which favored sanctions against Pakistan.[18] If "shortsighted and repressive domestic policies [like Pakistan's] are used to justify foreign military intervention," Kissinger observes, "the international order will soon be deprived of all restraints."[19] More important to him than opposing the genocide in Bangladesh were the urgent requirements of international equilibrium. These hinged on protecting Washington's new relationship with China and reassuring "allies like Iran and Turkey . . . ," countries that "sympathized with Pakistan . . . and looked to our reaction [to India's invasion] as a token of American steadiness in potential crises affecting them."[20]

Those of us concerned with preventing genocide should note that Kissinger never mentions the selective genocide perpetrated by Pakistan before the Indian army entered East Pakistan. In Kissinger's intellectual perspective, the repeated calls by State Department officials for U.S. measures to rein in Pakistan were unwelcome. They undoubtedly fell into his category of proposals arising from dangerously "fluctuating emotions" generated by "an idealistic tradition that sees foreign policy as a contest between good and evil."[21] Refusal to acknowledge the existence of genocide prior to India's attack and its relevance to a troubled world order characterizes Kissinger's account of the India-Pakistan crisis of 1971.[22]

B. GENOCIDE TO DOMINATE A DOMESTIC ETHNIC GROUP: BURUNDI

The mass killing in Burundi in 1972 that took the lives of an estimated 100,000 Africans of the Hutu tribe within a period of six weeks was an ethnic genocide designed to annihilate every Hutu with education, a government job, or money. The perpetrators of these killings intended to destroy all the educated and semi-educated Hutu in Burundi. Moreover, from their point of view, the selective genocide was a success. Almost all of Burundi's roughly 4,100,000 Hutu were excluded from the army, the public service, the university, and secondary schools.[23] Today Burundi is run by an elite drawn from its estimated 675,000 Tutsi. And thanks to the genocide, the rulers can also say with straight faces that there are no Hutu qualified to fill jobs that require more than the minimum skills.

An important part of the background to genocide in Burundi was the earlier uprising by Hutu in Rwanda that cost the lives of an estimated 100,000 Tutsi. While not excusing the actions of the Tutsi in Burundi, the revolution in Rwanda explains the Tutsi elite's fears that its power might be seized by the Hutu in their own country. As René Lemarchand has shown, the Hutu revolution in Rwanda played a major role in undermining the web of clan, lineage, regional and national political ties that cut across ethnic lines and distinguished Burundi from Rwanda. Fear of a Hutu rising in Burundi accentuated ethnic conflict for the first time in its modern history.[24]

The genocide in Burundi in 1972 sparked the flight of an estimated 165,000 Hutu refugees to Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania. Most of the refugees returned to their homeland after President Bagaza came to office only to encounter another, more spontaneous round of mass killings in August 1988 which took the lives of an estimated 20,000 Hutu and sent another 43,000 refugees scurrying into Rwanda for protection.[25]

Mislabeling of events and shallow reporting characterize the articles on Burundi that did appear in the New York Times. During the many weeks that the selective genocide in Burundi was underway, the Times' stories made it sound as if the Tutsi were the real victims and simple "tribal warfare" was the problem.

The Tutsi elite in Bujumbura, Burundi's capital, found its strongest allies in Zaire and France. For these governments, selective genocide was no reason to impose penalties on Burundi. When the government of Belgium threatened Burundi with sanctions unless the killing stopped, France stepped in with an offer to supply whatever aid Belgium decided to withhold.[26] Among the Communist countries, North Korea and China backed the government of Burundi during the genocide, while the Soviet Union joined the Western powers in a mild and ineffectual protest note.[27] The Organization of African Unity actually endorsed Burundi's actions, resolving at its meeting in June 1972 that President Micombero had advanced the cause of peace, national unity, and territorial integrity.[28] As for the United Nations, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim largely devoted himself to providing humanitarian assistance after the genocide was over. There was no public outcry at United Nations headquarters in New York over the fact that troops in Burundi had commandeered UNICEF Landrovers and trucks to take the Hutu to their deaths.[29] As a club of sovereign governments, the attitude of the United Nations accurately represented the studied indifference of most of its members.

C. GENOCIDE TO FULFILL AN IDEOLOGY: INDONESIA, CAMBODIA, AND ETHIOPIA

Ideological motivations have played a major role in all the great genocides of the twentieth century. Underlying the genocides in Cambodia was the Marxist-Leninist search for a perfect society. The ideological

motive that sparked the genocide in Indonesia in October 1965 was hostility to Marxism-Leninism.[30] Short and sharp compared to the genocides of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978 and the government of Ethiopia from 1974 to the present, the Indonesian genocide took the lives of some 500,000 persons. For Cambodia, the best estimates place the number of deaths due to genocide at between one and two million out of a population of roughly seven million. They were victims of Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge party, a movement that carried out a vast experiment in social engineering aimed at erasing the past in order to build a perfect future.[31] Some of the critics of American policy in Vietnam now maintain that Khmer Rouge brutality was a byproduct of the wartime American bombing, but--as D.S. Greenway notes--they do not explain why the government of Laos, subjected to even heavier bombing, did not follow the Khmer Rouge example.[32]

The Indonesian genocide produced very few refugees. The reason for this is not very clear to us. Perhaps it was because the victims had very little warning of the Indonesian military's plans or because no neighboring country would give the victims sanctuary. An estimated 600,000 alleged communists were arrested and placed in concentration camps by the government in the aftermath of the genocide. In the years that the Khmer Rouge governed Cambodia at least 30-40,000 refugees reached Thailand and in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge's defeat by the army of Vietnam the number of Cambodian refugees in Thailand swelled to some 313,000. This second wave included guerrillas supporting King Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge cadres, but it was composed mainly of refugees trying to escape from a devastated society.[33]

The stories told by the first refugees who fled from Cambodia were not believed by many critics of the Vietnam war who saw in the claims of the refugees a CIA effort to discredit the victory of the Cambodian and Vietnamese communists.[34] Contributing to the initial skepticism about a genocide was tight control clamped on all sources of information by the Khmer Rouge immediately after they came to power. William Shawcross' point that refugees fleeing dictatorships have always been good witnesses about the states they left behind was still not appreciated by journalists.[35] Without any means to document their testimony, the refugees had to wait for the revelations of the Vietnamese who ended Pol Pot's reign of terror

in January 1979 to secure vindication.

Faced with a choice between the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge, the people of Cambodia are once more caught between the proverbial tiger and the crocodile. In 1979, with United States support, the United Nations General Assembly voted to continue the seating of Khmer Rouge officials as the official representatives of their country despite their record of genocide in Cambodia. The great powers are now trying to decide whether the Khmer Rouge should be admitted to a coalition government in Cambodia. American foreign policy is still dedicated to limiting Vietnamese and Soviet power in the region. Preventing the Khmer Rouge from regaining the power of life and death over the Cambodians has been deemed a domestic and entirely secondary matter by the Bush administration. These developments remind us of René Lemarchand's pertinent observation that "what goes by the name of an international conscience is the expression of convergent national interests, not of a global commitment to moral values." It is a point that we would do well to remember.[36]

ENDNOTES

1. Jules Baillet, Le régime pharaonique dans ses rapports avec l'évolution de la m drawing this paragraph to our attention.

2. Saul Friedlander "On Representations of the Shoah," a lecture presented at the

3. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford Universit

4. Friedlander, "On Representations of the Shoah."

5. Amos Funkenstein, "Theological Interpretations of the Holocaust," in Unanswer edition 1985), p.303.

6. R. Lemkin, "Autobiography," Typescript, chapter 9, p. 27, Lemkin Papers, New

7. K..B. Bardakjian, Hitler and the Armenian Genocide, Special Report No. 3 (Camb

8. For the purposes of our research we have adopted the following definition of g

   GENOCIDE is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other au

   A full explanation of the terms of this definition will be found in Part I of Fran Press, forthcoming in 1990). For arguments on the inclusion of social and politi Prediction and Prevention," Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 4 (1989), no.2:14

9. It would also have been possible to develop the argument that most of the gen to examine in detail in a future paper.

10. For important discussions of these patterns, see Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke University Press, 1989) and Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkel

11. Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Poli

12. These events are recounted in many articles and books. Among the best sourc Report 20 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival, 1986) and Robert D. Kaplan, Su

13. International Herald Tribune, November 20, 1989, p.7.

14. Robert D. Kaplan, "The African Killing Fields," The Washington Monthly, 28, no.

15. J. Clay and B. Holcomb, Politics and the Ethiopian Famine, p.53; The Economist,

16. Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness, p.224.

17. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979)

18. Ibid., pp.897-898.

19. Ibid., p.915.

20. Ibid., pp.886, 914.

21. Ibid., pp.914-915.

22. Nixon and Kissinger did not recognize that India might have shot itself in the f more of an asset to China than to India or the Soviet Union (This observation f even advocates of a foreign policy based on raisons d'etat with the credentials defend human rights--is actually in accord with their geopolitical interest.

23. René Lemarchand, "Ethnic Genocide," Society, 12 (1975), no. 2: 57.

24. René Lemarchand, "Burundi: Ethnicity and the Ethics of Responsibility," a pape Criminal Justice, New York, N.Y., May 22-23, 1989.

25. Gazette (Montreal), August 22, 1988, p.B1; August 23, 1988, p.A10; Africa Con

26. Lemarchand, "Ethnic Genocide," p. 55.

27. Ibid., p.59.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp.59-60.

30. See Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the Oc Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978).

31. On Cambodia, see François Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero (Harmondsworth: Pe

Simon and Schuster, 1986).

32. D. S. Greenway, "Report from Cambodia: The Tiger and the Crocodile," The New

33. Michael Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982 (Boston: South End Press, 1984), pp.28

34. See, in particular, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, "Distortions at Fourth

35. See his discussion in The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Co

36. R. Lemarchand, "Ethnic Genocide," p.60.

the genocide, but his request was denied. When the genocide was already underway, he asked for the jamming of Radio RTLM, but this request was also denied. In Rwanda, for the first time since the creation of the UN Genocide Convention, UN troops were forced to stand by passively while hundreds of thousands of victims were slaughtered all around them.

V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Never again can we say "Never")

The propensity of modern genocide to take the form of what was called "autogenocide" in the case of Cambodia has made the detection of genocides in their early stages especially difficult. Perpetrators often seek to conceal their aims and frequently act under the cover of wartime secrecy. But despite their best efforts, they are never completely successful in concealing their lethal activities from the outside world. In addition to denunciations of their activities by defectors and conscience-stricken perpetrators, at their outset most modern genocides have generated enormous numbers of refugees. It is precisely at this stage--when thousands of human beings have demonstrated the seriousness of the threat to their survival by abandoning their homes and fleeing for their lives--that the efficacy of humanitarian intervention is greatest.

Foreign military interventions on humanitarian grounds are often controversial, but a broadly based consensus on the meaning of humanitarian intervention is reflected in the writings of Thomas M. Franck, Nigel S. Rodley, and Michael Bazyler. For Franck and Rodley, humanitarian intervention is intervention which recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international control by military force over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the laws of humanity. For Michael Bazyler, "The international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention recognizes the right of one nation to use force against another nation for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of that other nation from inhumane treatment by their governing sovereign."

No one should underestimate the barriers to a successful humanitarian intervention to stop a genocide or the increased opportunities for purely selfish international aggression which the widespread acceptance of humanitarian intervention could pose. There are solid arguments on both sides in the debate over the desirability of a new

international order in which humanitarian interventions would be encouraged. Chief among the barriers to be overcome is the centuries old tradition of national sovereignty itself. The idea that states must live up to certain international standards in how they treat their nationals must battle with the much older notion that governments should reign supreme within their own boundaries. And the idea that regional organizations, the Organization of African Unity to take one example, should fight against the inequalities and injustices existing within their members own borders must contend with the notion that such organizations must never interfere in the domestic affairs of their members.

Nor can we ignore geopolitical considerations as obstacles to humanitarian intervention. Influenced by the strategic considerations raised by the Cold War, the United States, to take one example, accepted the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists in Indonesia, a genocidal colonial repression of the people of East Timor, and the murder of hundreds of thousands of people in East Pakistan. In the case of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, Henry Kissinger even led a drive to condemn India's successful military campaign to stop the mass killings of civilians by the army of Pakistan. Kissinger perceived India as an ally of the Soviet Union and viewed Pakistan as a key ally in his drive to reopen diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Paradoxically, the apparent end of the Cold War created new problems in its place--first, neo-isolationism, which led the United States to abandon its interest in dozens of poor nations that are no longer of strategic importance, and second, a revival of hyper-nationalism and genocides among the peoples released from bondage by the fracturing of the Soviet Union and its client states

VI. PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS

In spite of these caveats, evidence is mounting that the climate of international public opinion is strongly shifting in favor of establishing one or more collective security mechanisms whereby military force or the threat of such force could be employed in new humanitarian interventions. Despite the clear violations of international law in its invasions of Grenada and Panama, these interventions were apparently popular among American voters and undoubtedly played a part in encouraging President

George Bush to wage the war that expelled Iraq from Kuwait. An unintended consequence of Operation Desert Storm was the emergence of a growing resolve among the countries of western Europe that they would never again grant the United States a monopoly in the management of future interventions launched on humanitarian grounds. Operation Desert Storm also revealed that the leaders of the former Soviet Union were neither willing nor able to assist one of their former allies if it put their access to western loans and commodities at risk.

With the end of the Cold War, new opportunities have been created for international collaboration on humanitarian intervention to stop genocides once they have been detected or are deemed to be imminent. For the past six years, a regional military intervention force of troops from a number of West African states has been trying to end the genocidal Liberian civil war. The past five years have witnessed a widespread campaign in the North American media for the creation of an international military force to stop the killing and the potential genocides in situations such as that which developed in Yugoslavia.

Before these efforts can bear fruit, the principles of intervention must be elaborated and the institutions that are capable of carrying out humanitarian interventions must be created or carved out of existing international bodies. Critics of humanitarian intervention are properly mindful of the fact that humanitarian excuses have often been used to justify unwarranted aggression and conquest. The great powers in the nineteenth century cited humanitarian concerns as the basis for their many interventions in the Ottoman Empire; the United States cited them when it ejected Spain from Cuba in 1898; Hitler justified his intervention in Czechoslovakia and Poland on humanitarian grounds; the Soviet Union used them as the basis for its operations in Afghanistan.

How is the international community to separate the few sheep of legitimate humanitarianism from the herd of expansionist goats that history reveals. In an important article published in 1987, Michael J. Bazyler proposed five criteria for the application of humanitarian intervention: (1) large-scale atrocities must be occurring or be anticipated; (2) the intervening states must be seen to have overriding humanitarian motive; (3) the United Nations should be allowed to intervene first and, if

it does not, collective intervention by a group of states should be attempted; (4) the aims of the intervention should be limited to ending the killing and, if required, removing the despot responsible for it; and (5) the intervening powers must exhaust other, peaceful remedies before intervening by force.

If principles such as these can be agreed upon by the Great Powers and a significant number of other states, what international body or bodies should carry them out? Hans Binnendijk underscores the importance of recognizing that there is a huge conceptual gap between traditional peacekeeping operations, which require the consent of all involved parties, and large peace-enforcement operations. A framework is needed, in his view, that closes the gap. Three existing organizations or treaty systems are frequently mentioned as possible vehicles for mounting humanitarian interventions: (1) the United Nations; (2) the Conference on Security and Cooperation; and (3) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; each possesses its own advantages and disadvantages.

The founders of the United Nations always intended that there should be a Military Staff Committee, comprised of representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, to oversee peacekeeping activities. Prior to the outbreak of the Cold War, they agreed that there could be no collective security without collective force. But the UN also has its weaknesses. As the American economy shrinks to something closer to America's pre-World War II position, more and more wealth is generated by its former enemies, Germany and Japan. Neither country is represented on the Security Council, although both would have to make substantial financial contributions if the UN was to operate its own intervention force. Some members of the United Nations are actively hostile to vigorous human rights monitoring and use their positions on the Security Council and/or the UN's Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations to sabotage the scrutinizing work of human rights organizations. In 1991, Cuba, Syria, Iraq, the Sudan, Libya and Algeria combined to block consultative status accreditation for America's largest human-rights monitoring organization, Human Rights Watch. The CSCE works on a"consensus-minus-one basis" that can render it inoperative as the sponsor of military interventions for humanitarian purposes. NATO is experienced in joint military planning, but it has no doctrine which covers

humanitarian intervention. As these words are being written in April 1997, the formation of a well-armed, rapid deployment force under U.N. auspices appears imminent.

Capitalist states today are faced with a crisis in their ability to fulfil expectations of greater prosperity and in their ability to protect their citizens against the pressures of the international economy. Socialist states have confessed to economic failure and turned towards capitalism for solutions to their economic problems. In the former states of the communist bloc, movements for democratic change have increased expectations of democracy, human rights, equality and a better quality of life just as the ability of capitalist and socialist states to shape events has dramatically declined. The ability of states to actually shape events seems to have declined dramatically and that decline has been accompanied by a renewed search for other forms of community, including those proposed by religious fundamentalists and hyper-nationalists. The governments of the former Yugoslavia illustrate how easily Communist bureaucrats can transform themselves into hyper-nationalists when nationalism appears to be the road to power.

VII. THE DENIAL OF GENOCIDE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE

A major characteristic of most modern genocides is that the perpetrators deny responsibility for their work. Revisionism, or the revision of history, takes the form of inventing a counter-history with two major characteristics: (1) the revisionists deny that the victim is a victim; and (2) the revisionists accuse the victim of being the perpetrator. In the case of the Holocaust, revisionists do not deny the existence of concentration camps; they accuse Jewish *kapos* of killing Jews in large numbers and attribute the other deaths to accidental circumstances such as the conditions of war or the need to concentrate the Jews because they allegedly had declared war against Germany. Revisionists also resort to forgeries like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to prove that there was a world conspiracy of Jews to rule the world or to use the war to obtain a state for the Jewish people.

In the denial of the Armenian genocide, revisionists argue that there were just a few local pogroms, which are exaggerated; that the deportations were necessary to quell potential Armenian insurrections;

and that the deportations were intended to protect the Armenians. Then we are told that the Armenians are manipulating us to gain sympathy for an Armenian claim to Turkish land and that the Armenians were really complicit in the Holocaust because some of them served in an SS unit.

Governments and movements that deny genocides are sowing the seeds for future genocides. Their denials are intended to demonize the surviving victims and their descendents. The suppression of the truth denies the children and the grandchildren of the perpetrators the opportunity to learn from their history and to prevent new assaults on humanity. Moreover, it supresses recognition of the heroism of those who sought to rescue the victims of the genocide although it was being carried out by their kin and in the name of their people.

VIII. PREVENTING GENOCIDE

How can genocide be prevented or at least the number of future cases diminished? In the Concordia course on the history and sociology of genocide, I follow the precedent of Sir Isaiah Berlin in introducing myself to the students as a secularist who believes in original sin. By the end of our two semester course, our students may very well conclude that democracy is the least evil and the most humane form of government; that the rule of law is the surest defense against the rise of leaders likely to commit genocide; and that political violence and theories that legitimize killing in the pursuit of political objectives are the seedbeds of most modern genocide. But they will also learn that constitutional government, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law will not arise in societies that are gripped by poverty and terrible ratios of population to resources. Thus the fight against future genocides is also today's fight for a fairer international economic regime for Third World peoples, for womens' rights, for planned parenthood, and for the enforcement of international law.

IX. CONCLUSION

Writing *Land Without Justice* in the year 1956-1957, the Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas recalled the Montenegro of his youth. In that hard, cruel society, he remembered, there was a proverb: "Man is a wolf to every other man." People seemed to think, says Djilas, that a man who did not act like that was not human. He concludes by observing that the times had become wicked, and the people grew wicked with the times, for, after all, it is the people who make the times. Perhaps there is a lesson for us in Djilas' words. The successful strategy of creating a "people of murderers" developed in Rwanda can be repeated in many Second and Third World countries. If dominant political elites feel they are losing their grips on power and turn to racist and extremist national ideologies, if overcrowding and poverty make the lives of the people miserable, if the dissemination of racist ideologies by radio broadcasting is not countered, if UN military intervention is rendered impotent by the hesitancy of the great powers, we can expect more Rwandas in the years to come. In Burundi, the fuse is already burning.

At this crucial juncture in the history of man's inhumanity to man, the world needs a reliable, powerful, and collective mechanism to carry out humanitarian interventions to stop genocides and to defuse fighting that threatens to lead to genocide. There are enormous risks in undertaking such a venture, as I have tried to show. But our respect for national sovereignty must not be absolute. Let us remember the statement of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which declared: "in the case of atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany against its own citizens, `humanity is the sovereignty which has been offended . . . .'"

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